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Managers as Administrators: Reputation and Incentives
Amil Dasguptay Yianis Saradisz
First version: February 2005 This version: December 2008
Abstract
In many rms managers play the role of administrators, adding value by successfully
implementing solutions to problems that the rm may face. We model the career concerns
of administrators. When administrators receive the same information but di¤er in their
administrative abilities, we show that they may not choose tasks that are appropriate
for the problems they face. In particular, in any pure strategy equilibrium of our model,
administrators do not condition their behavior on any of their private information, despite
the fact that they are risk neutral and know their administrative ability. We thus identify
a novel source of incentive conicts in rms. We also examine the robustness of these
results to various extensions.
JEL: D82, C72
Keywords: Incentive conicts, career concerns, reputation, conformism
1 Introduction
Fama (1980) proposed that incentive problems within rms may be eliminated by managers
concerns about their reputations in the labor market, commonly referred to as their career
concerns. Following Holmstroms (1982) inuential theoretical analysis of this question, a
growing literature (which we survey below) has modelled the career concerns of managers
and implications for incentives within rms. With only a few exceptions, this literature has
We thank the co-editor, Claude Menard, and three anonymous referees for their insightful comments. We
are grateful to Ron Anderson, Heski Bar-Isaac, Peter Miller, Stephen Morris, Ben Polak, Andrea Prat, and
Hyun Shin for helpful discussions, and seminar audiences at the LSE and INSEAD for their comments.
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a.dasgupta@lse.ac.uk
zCRA International, 1201 F Street N.W., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004, USA. E-mail:
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focussed on the career concerns of managers who wish to build a reputation for having ac-
cess to precise information. While this story ts a large class of applications (e.g., analysts
forecasting earnings, mutual fund managers picking underpriced stocks), it is not universally
applicable. In some settings, managers wish to build reputations not for being better in-
formed, but for being better administrators. This arises in organizations in which managers
add value not by identifying the appropriate solution, but simply by e¢ ciently implement-
ing it. University administrators represent a natural example. It may not take a specially
capable dean to identify solutions to the problems faced by a small college. Implementing
solutions, however, involves balancing several distinct stakeholder interests (academics, ad-
ministrators, and students) and may be di¢ cult. Able deans can successfully implement
potentially complex changes to their universities. Civil servants in large government depart-
ments are also primarily administrators. They also require expertise to implement complex
changes successfully while balancing di¤ering interests and lobbies.
In this paper, we focus on the impact of career concerns in organizations in which man-
agers wish to build reputations as good administrators. We argue that career-concerned
administrators will engage in suboptimal behavior: they will choose solutions that are inap-
propriate for addressing the challenges faced by their organizations. The mechanism driving
such behavior di¤ers from those analyzed in extant models of career concerns.
1.1 Model and Results
An organization is faced with a problem that is either trivial or complex. The board of
directors (principal) of the organization hires an administrator (agent) to identify and solve
the problem. The appropriate solution, in turn, can be trivial or complex. The board does
not know the nature of the problem faced by the organization. The agent it hires does. This
agent, in turn, can have di¤erent levels of ability, high or low, in implementing (administering)
a solution. The board does not know the ability of the agent it has hired. The agent does.
The type of the agent does not a¤ect his ability to understand the nature of the organiza-
tions problem. Ability di¤erences between agents are restricted to their relative probabilities
of successfully implementing solutions. We thus focus only on implementation or adminis-
trative ability. In particular, we assume that a more able agent has a stochastic advantage in
implementing complex changes to the organization. The administrative ability of the agent
does not, however, a¤ect his chances of implementing the trivial course of action.
The agent is long-lived and is faced with a labor market that values ability. His actions and
the outcomes are observed by the principals and by the labor market as a whole. His current
wage cannot be made contingent on his actions and their consequences, but his future wages
are. Thus the agent cares only about his reputation: he is motivated by career concerns.
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From the perspective of the principals, it is best if the agent, regardless of his type,
chooses to take the trivial course of action when faced with the trivial problem and the more
complex one to deal with the complex problem. We call this the rst-best strategy prole.
1. In our main result, we show that this rst-best strategy prole cannot be implemented
in equilibrium in the presence of career concerns. Suppose that the rst-best were an
equilibrium and that the problem is complex. Taking the trivial action does not change
the principals beliefs about the agents type in this equilibrium. Thus, the agents
expected payo¤, regardless of type, from taking the trivial action is simply the prior.
We show that the martingale property of Bayesian posteriors implies that if the agent
did not know his type, his expected payo¤ from taking the complex action would also
be the prior. Thus, if the agent did not know his type, he would be indi¤erent between
the two actions. It is then not possible, when agents know their type, for both types of
agents to prefer the same action. Thus, if the rst-best were an equilibrium, both types
of agents must be indi¤erent between the complex and the trivial actions when faced
with the complex problem, but this cannot be true since the complex action separates
the good agents from the bad, and the trivial action does not.1
2. We show that the only equilibria in pure strategies involve complete conformism: re-
gardless of the nature of the problem faced by the agent and his known ability, he will,
in equilibrium, take the same action. Thus, our model leads to substantial amounts of
information being trapped in equilibrium.
3. We examine a number of natural extensions to our baseline analysis. First, instead of
having complete self-knowledge, we allow the agent to receive only a noisy signal about
his type. We show that for generically chosen precisions of self-knowledge, our baseline
results are una¤ected. Second, we consider the possibility that the high type also has
a stochastic advantage in implementing the trivial action, and identify an alternative
state-monotonicity condition su¢ cient to preserve our main result. Finally, we consider
mixed-strategy equilibria. We characterize the set of mixed strategy equilibria that can
exist in our model. In addition, we show via an example that it is possible to construct
partially informative mixed strategy equilibria which approximate the rst-best strategy
prole when the implementation abilities of high and low type agents are su¢ ciently
similar.
1We note that the equilibrium non-implementability of the rst-best is not driven by the usual incentive to
imitatethat can destroy separating equilibria in reputational cheap talk games. Under the rst-best strategy
prole, both the low and the high types are required to take the same action in equilibrium, but choose not
to do so. Depending on the state and on the parameters of the model, it is possible that either the low type
or the high type wishes to deviate from the proposed equilibrium strategies.
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Our results suggest that career-concerned administrators in the real world may be too
eager to undertake (overtly) grandiose projects or too reluctant to undertake innovative
(but appropriate) projects. In the conclusion, we consider whether the available anecdotal
evidence about leading classes of administrators is consistent these predictions. We now
relate our results to the literature.
1.2 Related Literature
The literature on career concerns began with the seminal work of Holmstrom. In the oft-
quoted rst part of this celebrated paper, he considered the positive role of career concerns
in resolving moral hazard problems. In a less-quoted second part, Holmstrom introduced a
model in which agents di¤ered in their ability to implement projects and considered whether
their career concerns could prevent them from choosing productive investment projects. He
focussed on a setting in which all agents received signals drawn from the same distribu-
tion (that is, ability did not turn on di¤erences in information precision), but nal output
depended on managerial type, which can thus be interpreted as implementation or admin-
istrative ability. Managerial ability was unknown to the manager, who, in turn, only cared
about his reputation. Agents could choose between investing and doing nothing. Investing
led to the possibility the principals would learn about their types and thus produced a lottery
that had the same expected value as the sure reputational payo¤ from doing nothing. Risk
averse agents chose not to invest, even when protability was likely to be high, and thus
behaved sub-optimally.2 The main incentive conict in Holmstroms model thus arose from
the fact that principals and agents were both uninformed about the agents type. Risk averse
agents understood that they could not improve their expected payo¤ by choosing projects
2Such behavior on the part of the agent is often referred to as signal-jamming, a term coined by Fudenberg
and Tirole (1986). Holmstrom and Ricart-i-costa (1986) went on to show that such perverse reputational
incentives could be tempered by providing explicit incentives. We are primarily interested in settings where
such explicit contracting is not feasible.
We note that results similar to ours can also arise with explicit contracting via di¤erent mechanisms. Two
papers in the large literature on CEO pay and incentives are worth highlighting in this context. In Dow and
Raposo (2005), CEOs choose srategy, and shareholders subsequently choose compensation. Since strategies
inducing dramatic change require higher e¤ort, these strategies induce higher explicit compensation, and thus
CEOs tend to propose excessively dramatic change. In contrast, in Inderst and Mueller (2008), major strategic
change is achieved via CEO replacement, yet shareholders rely on reports from the CEO on the desirability
of strategic change and incentivize him via severance pay. In equilibrium, the incidence of major strategic
change is suboptimally low.
In section 3.2 of his paper, Holmstrom provides an example of an incentive conict that arises even with a
risk neutral agent when the agent has some private information (about the project success probability) but
cannot convey it in a veriable manner. He maintains, however, the hypothesis that the agent has no private
information about his type.
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and rationally chose inaction.
In sharp contrast, we consider settings in which managers are risk neutral and know
their own types, thus eliminating the source of perverse behavior in Holmstroms work.3
Nevertheless, we show that the presence of career concerns leads to systematic incentive
problems and supoptimal project-choice within rms.
A handful of papers, including Zwiebel (1995) and Biglaiser and Mezzetti (1997), have
followed Holmstrom in focusing on implementation ability. The latter is more closely related
to our work. Biglaiser and Mezzetti consider a career concerns model where the agent (a
politician) decides whether to undertake a project, which will reveal to the principal (vot-
ers) information about the agents ability. In contrast to our model, however, there is no
asymmetry of information between the agent and the principal.4
Starting with Scharfstein and Stein (1990), much of the recent literature on career con-
cerns has moved away from settings in which agents di¤er in implementation ability and has
focussed instead on informational di¤erences across agents. In these so-called expertsmod-
els, agents di¤er in the precision of their imperfect information about some common state
and receive utility from their ex post reputation based on their prediction (or action) and the
realized state.5 Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a,b) provide a general analysis of this class of
models and show that truthtelling is generically infeasible. They show that in leading versions
of these models, reputational incentives lead experts to bias their predictions towards what is
expected a priori because imperfectly informed experts anticipate that extreme predictions
are likely to be viewed, ex post, as the result of low precision signals, thus damaging their
reputation.
While administrators in our model share with these experts a desire to take the ex post
reputation-enhancing action, our approach is very di¤erent. Unlike experts models, where
di¤erent types receive di¤erent quality information, all types of administrators in our model
are equally informed. In fact, they are perfectly informed about both the state of the world
and about their own types. Administrators di¤er only in their ability to implement a course
of action based on this information. The di¤erence in the mechanisms that generate per-
verse behavior in the two types of models can perhaps be best illustrated by considering
the e¤ect of self-knowledge. In leading experts models, the incentive to misrepresent the
3Neither Holmstrom nor we consider risk-loving behavior. It is worth noting that risk-loving behavior has
been shown to arise endogenously in some career concerns models, as in Li (2007).
4 In an extension of their benchmark model (see section 5.2 of their paper), they also look at the case
where the agent has private information about his own type, but still, their agent does not have any private
information about the characteristics of the project, or state of the world, and the resulting equilibrium set is
very di¤erent from ours.
5Papers in this literature include, for example, Prendergast and Stole (1996) and Brandenburger and Polak
(1996).
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truth is usually higher when experts do not know the precision of their own information.
With self-knowledge, such incentives are tempered, and informative equilibria become pos-
sible (Ottaviani and Sorensen 2006a). In our model, exactly the opposite is true. In the
baseline model, informative equilibrium behavior is impossible precisely when administrators
are perfectly aware of their abilities. While such misrepresentation persists with imperfect
self-knowledge, in the case where managers have no self-knowledge at all (as in the canonical
expertsmodel), the rst-best course of action can trivially be implemented.6
Finally, a less related class of models denes ability as congruence of the agents prefer-
ences with those of the principal. Sobel (1985), Benabou and Laroque (1992), Morris (2001),
Ely and Valimaki (2003) and Ely et al. (2008) are some examples of such work, giving rise
to reputational cheap-talk games in the tradition of Crawford and Sobel (1982). In these
models, in contrast to ours, the agent has an intrinsic preference for some action.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we analyze the baseline model.
In section 3 we consider several extensions. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
A principal (a board of directors) in charge of an organization hires an agent (an administra-
tor) to solve a problem. The nature of the problem (state !) that the organization faces can
be either complex (! = C) or trivial (! = T ). The board does not observe the state ! and
believes that the problem is complex with probability !. The agent who is hired discovers
the true state ! with certainty.
The agents expertise also lies in implementing a course of action. The agent can take two
types of actions () to solve the problem. He can either undertake a complex reorganization
( = c) or make trivial changes ( = t, i.e. do nothing substantial and simply run the
day-to-day operations). Each of these actions induces a result () which may be a success
( = S), upon which the problem is solved, or failure ( = F ).
The agent can be of two types (), depending on his skills as an administrator. He may
be characterized by either high ability ( = H) or low ability ( = L). Though the agent
knows his type with certainty, the board does not. The board believes that the agent is of
the high type with probability . We explain below how ability di¤erentiates the two types.
Whether the problem faced by the organization will be solved depends on three factors:
the type of the agent () who implements the action, the nature of the problem (!), and the
6Milbourn et al. (2001) and Suurmomd et al. (2004) diverge from traditional experts model by allowing
the agent to invest in information before he chooses which project to undertake. In Milbourn et al. the agent
does not know his type. Suurmoond et al. allow for self-knowledge but, as is standard in experts models,
focus only on di¤erences in information precision.
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action () undertaken to address the problem. We denote the success probability function
by p(; !; ) = Pr[ = Sj; !; ]. We assume that 0 < p(; !; ) < 1 for all type-state-action
triples (; !; ).
Whether trivial changes succeed or fail does not depend on the implementors type. Thus,
Assumption 1: p(L; !; t) = p(H;!; t) for all states !.
However, complex changes require the skills of the agent in order to be implemented, and
thus the probability of successful implementation is type-dependent. We assume
Assumption 2: p(L; !; c) < p(H;!; c) for all states !.
The board observes the action taken by the agent and the result. The agent cares only
about the opinion that the principal (and, by extension, the entire labor market) forms of
him upon observing his action and the outcome: q(; ) = Pr[ = Hj; ].7 Thus, our
career-concerned administrators payo¤s derive purely from his reputation.8 We denote by
(!) the (pure) action taken by the agent of type  when the state is ! and look for perfect
Bayesian equilibria of this game.
2.1 The Impossibility of Implementing the First-Best
The rst-best solution from the perspective of the board involves the agent taking the complex
action  = c (resp. the trivial action  = t) if and only if he faces a complex problem ! = C
(resp. a trivial problem ! = T ). In our notation, the rst-best strategy prole is given by
(T ) = t and (C) = c for all types .
There are several ways to justify this prole as the rst-best. For example, it could be
that trivial solutions hardly ever resolve complex problems, but usually resolve trivial ones.
Complex solutions, on the other hand, usually resolve complex problems as well as trivial
ones, but are inherently hard to implement. Thus, trivial solutions are better for trivial
problems.9 Alternately, it could be that complex solutions are more expensive to implement,
so even if they are better at solving all problems, after accounting for costs, it may be better
to implement the trivial solution for trivial problems. The appropriate microfoundation for
the rst-best would depend on the application in question. Our results do not depend on the
details of such microfoundation.
We can now state our main result: The rst-best can never be implemented in equilibrium.
7The set up we have just described gives rise to a psychological game, as in Geanakoplos et al. (1989).
8 It is commonly assumed in the literature on career concerns that agents care only about their reputation
(e.g., Scharfstein and Stein). It would be straightforward to micro-found the agents payo¤ by using devices
that are standard in the literature on career concerns.
9This can be captured by assuming that p(; C; c) > p(; C; t) and p(; T; c) < p(; T; t) for each type .
7
Page 8 of 20
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Proposition 1 The (rst-best) strategy prole (T ) = t and (C) = c for all types 
cannot arise in equilibrium.
The proof of this result, as well as those of all subsequent results, is relegated to the
appendix. The intuition behind the result is both simple and general. Suppose the rst-best
strategy prole did constitute an equilibrium. In this equilibrium agents do not condition
their behavior on their type. This means that if the principal sees the trivial action  = t;
he does not update his beliefs about the type of the agent: the action choice provides no
information about the type and, for the trivial action  = t, neither does the esult. Thus,
for any type of agent, in any state, the expected payo¤ from choosing the trivial action  = t
is simply . Now, consider a simple thought experiment. Let the state be complex, ! = C.
Imagine that the agent knows that the state is ! = C, but does not know his type. Then, the
argument we have just made establishes that his expected payo¤ from choosing the trivial
action  = t is . The crucial step in our proof is to show that his expected payo¤ from
taking action  = c is also exactly . This is a consequence of two things: the Martingale
property of Bayesian posteriors and the fact that, in the rst-best, the principal can deduce
the state from the agentsactions.
Therefore, before knowing his type the agent must be exactly indi¤erent between the two
actions in state ! = C. It is then not possible, after knowing the type, for both types to prefer
the same action, unless they are both indi¤erent. Thus, if the rst-best were an equilibrium,
then both types of the agent must derive the same excess utility from taking the complex
action as the trivial action. However this, in turn, cannot be true since the complex action
separates the good agent from the bad while the trivial action does not. Thus, the rst-best
cannot be an equilibrium.
This argument clearly depends on the existence of the trivial action,  = t, for which
the probability of success is una¤ected by the type. It seems reasonable to assume that
administrators in most organizations always have access to the trivial action because they
always have the option (in any given period) of carrying on business as usual, that is,
e¤ectively of doing nothing. The outcome of doing nothing is unlikely to depend on the
administrative ability of the agent. We thus believe that this is not a particularly strong
assumption. We nevertheless show below (in section 3.2) that it can be relaxed, and our
main result holds under an alternative (state monotonicity) assumption.
2.2 Conformism in Equilibrium
We now consider other possible pure strategy equilibria of our game. It is easy to see that
an almost identical argument to that in Proposition 1 can rule out the symmetric strategy
prole (T ) = c and (C) = t for all types . We consider next strategy proles in which
8
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the agent conditions his actions on both his type () and the state (!). We show that such
proles cannot be supported as equilibria, except in non-generic cases.
Proposition 2 The strategy prole
H(!) =
(
c ! = C
t ! = T
and L(!) =
(
t ! = C
c ! = T
cannot arise in equilibrium, except in the non-generic case where p(H;C; c) = p(L; T; c).
The formal proof shows that in order for this strategy prole to be an equilibrium, it
must be that success and failure in implementing the complex solution lead to precisely the
same opinion about the ability of the agent. In turn, it is shown that this can occur only in
the non-generic case in which p(H;C; c) = p(L; T; c). A symmetric argument rules out the
analogous strategy prole
H(!) =
(
t ! = C
c ! = T
; L(!) =
(
c ! = C
t ! = T
except in the non-generic case with p(H;T; c) = p(L;C; c). It is apparent that strategy
proles in which some action perfectly reveals the type cannot arise in equilibrium. This is
because when a fully revealing action exists, the low type agent will always imitate the high
type agent. This argument rules out, for example, strategy proles of the form H(!) = c
and L(!) = t for all states ! and its symmetric counterpart H(!) = t and L(!) = c for
all states !. This argument also rules out strategy proles of the form
H(!) =
(
t ! = C
t ! = T
; L(!) =
(
t ! = C
c ! = T
and various similar counterparts.
Finally, we are left with only two remaining strategy proles: (!) = c for all type-state
pairs (; !), and (!) = t for all type-state pairs (; !). Both of these involve complete
conformism. They can both be supported in equilibrium by simple o¤-equilibrium beliefs.
For example the prole (!) = c for all type-state pairs (; !), can be supported as a Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium with the following o¤-equilibrium belief: q(t; ) = Pr( = Hj = t; ) =
0 for all results . Equilibrium payo¤s for both types of agents are positive while deviation
payo¤s are 0. Thus we can state
Proposition 3 The only possible equilibria in pure strategies consist of the strategy proles
(!) = c for all type-state pairs (; !), and (!) = t for all type-state pairs (; !).
9
Page 10 of 20
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Therefore, the pure strategy equilibrium set is characterized by complete conformism.
Though agents have perfect information about two di¤erent variables (their ability and the
nature of the problem faced by the organization), their actions reveal none of this information
in equilibrium. Note that our model is silent about which of these two equilibria will arise.
The unifying theme of our results is that the presence of career concerns can lead adminis-
trators to choose either overtly ambitious or excessively cautious projects with no regard to
the needs of their organizations.10
Our result on conformism complements the large literature on herd-like behavior in se-
quential settings arising either purely from observational learning (e.g. Banerjee 1992 and
Bikhchandani et al. 1992) or from a combination of observational learning and reputational
concerns (e.g. Scharfstein and Stein 1990, Dasgupta and Prat 2008). The mechanism induc-
ing conformism in our model is di¤erent, and conformism arises in a purely static setting.
3 Extensions
In this section, we consider a number of natural extensions of the model.
3.1 Imperfect Self-Knowledge
We rst relax the assumption that the agent knows his ability perfectly. We show that as
long as the agent has some degree of self knowledge, our results will hold. We assume that
the agent does not know his type but, instead, at the beginning of the game receives a signal,
s 2 fL;Hg, about his ability. The signal is drawn from the following distribution
Pr[s = ij = i] = k  1
2
for i = L;H (1)
where k parameterizes the extent of self-knowledge. When k = 1 we obtain the baseline
model. When k = 12 the agent has no private information about his type. As we have already
seen, an agent who has no private information about his type is indi¤erent between taking
either action and our model is trivial. We thus focus on the case where k > 12 .
Denote the strategy of an agent who has received signal s in the state ! by s(!) 2 ft; cg.
Thus, the rst-best strategy prole in the game with signals is s(T ) = t and s(C) = c for
all signals s. We show that this cannot be an equilibrium.
Proposition 4 For k > 12 the strategy prole s(T ) = t and s(C) = c for all signals s
cannot be an equilibrium.
10We examine the possibility of partially informative equilibria in mixed strategies in section 3.3.
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An identical argument rules out the strategy prole s(T ) = c and s(C) = t for all
signals s. Next we show that there cannot exist equilibria in which the agent conditions on
both his signal and on the state.
Proposition 5 For k > 12 the strategy prole
H(!) =
(
c ! = C
t ! = T
and L(!) =
(
t ! = C
c ! = T
cannot be supported as an equilibrium other than for non-generic values of k.
An identical argument rules out the analogous strategy prole where the low type behaves
optimally. Finally, it is clear that there are no equilibria of the form where the agents action
reveals perfectly his signal as having the high signal leads to a higher probability of being of
the high ability type, and thus agents with low signals would wish to imitate agents with high
signals. Thus, again, the only remaining pure strategy equilibria are of complete conformism,
just as in the baseline case.
3.2 No trivialaction
In the baseline model we assumed that the agent has access to a trivial action whose likelihood
of success is independent of the implementors type. We now eliminate Assumption 1 and
assume instead that the function p(; !; ) is strictly monotonic in !, for all type-action
pairs (; ). We then extend Assumption 2 to incorporate both actions so that p(L; !; ) <
p(H;!; ) for all state-action pairs (!; ). Our main result is still valid:
Proposition 6 If p(; !; ) is strictly monotone in ! for all (; ) and p(L; !; ) < p(H;!; )
for all (!; ), then the rst-best strategy prole cannot arise in equilibrium.11
To derive intuition for this result, suppose that p(; C; ) < p(; T; ) for all (; ). If the
rst-best strategy prole were an equilibrium, it must be the case that in the trivial state,
! = T , both agents prefer to take the trivial action, but state monotonicity implies that the
payo¤ to each type of agent from taking the complex action in the state ! = T will be strictly
higher than the payo¤ to each type of taking the complex action in the complex state, ! = C.
This is due to the fact that the complex action (by state monotonicity) fails more often in
state ! = C than in state ! = T , thus increasing the probability of a negative evaluation for
the agent. In sum, if the rst-best strategy prole were an equilibrium, it would be the case
11 If p(; !; ) is only weakly monotonic in the state !, then Proposition 6 would still hold for generically
chosen values of p(; ; ).
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that each type of agent would strictly prefer to take the trivial action in state ! = T than
the complex action in state ! = C. However, since these are both equilibrium actions, we
can reapply the thought experiment utilized for the main result to note that before the agent
knew his type, he must receive the same expected payo¤ () from taking the equilibrium
action in each state. This leads to a contradiction.
3.3 Mixed Strategies
While our focus has been on equilibria in pure strategies, we now provide some analysis of
mixed-strategy equilibria. We begin with the following observation. In any equilibrium where
q(c; S)  q(c; F ) > 0,12 if in any state ! the high (low) type either mixes or prefers the trivial
(complex) action, then the low (high) type must strictly prefer the trivial (complex) action.13
We represent a mixed-strategy prole as a matrix where rows refer to states (C; T ) and
columns refer to types (H;L). An element of this matrix, mi;j is the probability that type j
chooses the complex action in state i. For example, the rst-best strategy prole is represented
by the matrix
1 1
0 0
. Then, the observation above implies that equilibrium matrices can
only be comprised by the following rows:
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 m m 0
where m 2 (0; 1). Therefore, we can have 5  5 = 25 types of equilibria. Out of these
25 candidate equilibria, 3  3 = 9 are pure-strategy equilibria, which we have already fully
characterized. Out of the remaining 16 candidate equilibria the following ones cannot arise
because the trivial action would reveal that the agent must be of low type:
1 1
1 m
1 m
1 1
1 0
1 m
1 m
1 0
1 m
1 n
:
Similarly, the following candidate equilibria cannot arise because the complex action would
reveal that the agent must be of high type:
0 0
m 0
m 0
0 0
1 0
m 0
m 0
1 0
m 0
n 0
:
Hence, we are left with the following six candidate equilibria:
1 1
m 0
1 m
0 0
1 m
n 0
m 0
1 1
0 0
1 m
m 0
1 n
:
12Equilibria which violate this condition are unnatural and could be ruled out by introducing a innitesimal
cost of e¤ort in successfully implementing the complex action.
13The proof is straightforward, and we omit it for brevity.
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Of these only three can approximate the rst-best strategy prole. These are
1 1
m 0
1 m
0 0
1 m
n 0
:
Given the substantial degrees of freedom in the choice of the function p(; ; ), the analysis
of these mixed-strategy equilibria is complex. Nevertheless, we can show, by example, that
(a) such equilibria can exist for reasonable parameter values, and (b) they can approximate
the rst-best when the stochastic advantage of the high type in implementing the complex
action becomes vanishingly small.
For example, suppose that  = ! = 12 , p(; T; t) = p, p(; T; c) = 0 and p(; C; t) = 0
for all . Let p(H;C; c) = p and p(L;C; c) = x, where x < p. Consider the candidate
equilibrium E1 =
1 1
m1 0
. The indi¤erence condition for the high type in the trivial state
yields m1 =
p x
2 x . It can be shown that with this value of m1 no type-state pair (; !) wishes
to deviate from the strategy prole E1. Finally, notice that as x! p, we have m1 ! 0 (i.e.,
the mixed-strategy equilibrium E1 approaches the rst-best). For the same parameter values,
there also exists another equilibrium, E2 =
1 m2
0 0
, in which the low type mixes in the
complex state. This equilibrium can be shown to share with E1 the property that m2 ! 1
as x! p.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have identied a new mechanism for incentive conicts within organizations
arising out of the career concerns of administrators. We have shown that career concerned
administrators will typically not choose actions that are ideal for their organizations.
At the outset, we motivated administrative career concerns by appeal to university admin-
istrators and civil servants. While our model is stylized, we now consider briey whether our
assumptions and conclusions are appropriate for these two leading classes of administrators.
The crucial assumption on observables in our model is the lack of explicit incentive con-
tracts. It is clear that the provision of su¢ cient explicit incentives would eliminate perverse
behavior in our model.14 There is, however, ample evidence that university administrators
and civil servants do not face explicit incentive contracts. Cornell (2004, 37) points out that
university presidents lack any meaningful incentive clauses in their contracts.Likewise, civil
servantscurrent wages are rarely contingent on current performance, but there is evidence
that future pay is. For example, with regard to senior civil servants, the U.K. Practitioners
14This critique applies more broadly to the literature on career concerns.
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Guide (2007, 9) states that, Base salary rewards value or contribution which is marked by
condence in the individuals future performance, based on sustained past performance.De-
watripont et al. (1990, 199) refer to this as the preponderance of career concerns.It seems
reasonable to assume, therefore, that these types of administrators are principally motivated
by career concerns.
Our theoretical conclusion is that career-concerned administrators may indulge in exces-
sively grandiose or excessively conservative behavior. While detailed empirical analysis is
di¢ cult, there is some anecdotal evidence that is consistent with these ndings. For exam-
ple, writing in the Chronicle of Higher Education about presidents of colleges in the United
States, Rita Bornstein (2003, B20) states: The higher education landscape is littered with
those who failed because their vision greatly exceeded available resources or they neglected
important institutional needs.Civil servants, on the other hand, are often accused of ex-
cessively cautious behavior. In a recent National Audit O¢ ce report (2000, 2), the United
Kingdoms Comptroller and Auditor General argues that it is the fear of failure that prevents
civil servants from undertaking innovative projects: Civil Service culture. . . has traditionally
been risk averse. This is partly because departments have tended to associate risk taking
with increasing the possibility of something going wrong, of project failure which could lead
to Parliamentary and public censure.15
Our model is stylized and simple. Richer models with greater institutional detail, built
around the central incentive conict identied here, represent potential tools for modelling
public sector organizations. Such analyses remain interesting territory for future research.
15Note that our model, like all models with multiple equilibria, is silent about whether administrators will
overindulge or underindulge in complex reorganizations. Thus, the model does not di¤erentiate between the
anecdotal evidence outlined here about civil servants and university administrators. Both pieces of evidence
are consistent with our model.
14
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the rst-best strategy prole were an equilibrium. Let the
state be complex, ! = C. Since neither type must be willing to deviate from the equilibrium
strategies, it must be the case that the following inequalities hold for the high and low types
respectively:
p(H;C; c)q(c; S) + [1  p(H;C; c)]q(c; F )  p(H;C; t)q(t; S) + [1  p(H;C; t)]q(t; F ); (2)
p(L;C; c)q(c; S) + [1  p(L;C; c)]q(c; F )  p(L;C; t)q(t; S) + [1  p(L;C; t)]q(t; F ): (3)
Notice that in this equilibrium the posterior q(t; ) equals the prior probability  for all
results  since the observed outcome from the trivial action does not di tinguish across types
and the choice of action does not depend on the type. Simple computation utilizing the
equilibrium strategies yields
q(c; S) =
p(H;C; c)
p(H;C; c) + p(L;C; c)(1  )
q(c; F ) =
(1  p(H;C; c))
(1  p(H;C; c)) + (1  p(L;C; c))(1  ) :
Multiply the previous inequalities by the prior probabilities  and 1 , respectively. Then,
add them up to obtain
  :
This implies that neither of the original inequalities can be strict. Thus, they must be
equalities. Subtracting one from the other yields
[p(H;C; c)  p(L;C; c)][q(c; S)  q(c; F )] = 0) q(c; S) = q(c; F ): (4)
Using the expressions for q(c; S) and q(c; F ) provided above, q(c; S) = q(c; F ) holds if and only
if p(H;C; c) = p(L;C; c), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. If this strategy prole were an equilibrium, then the following
would hold:
p(L; T; c)q(c; S) + [1  p(L; T; c)]q(c; F )  p(L; T; t)q(t; S) + [1  p(L; T; t)]q(t; F ) (5)
p(H;T; t)q(t; S) + [1  p(H;T; t)]q(t; F )  p(H;T; c)q(c; S) + [1  p(H;T; c)]q(c; F ) (6)
p(L;C; t)q(t; S) + [1  p(L;C; t)]q(t; F )  p(L;C; c)q(c; S) + [1  p(L;C; c)]q(c; F ) (7)
p(H;C; c)q(c; S) + [1  p(H;C; c)]q(c; F )  p(H;C; t)q(t; S) + [1  p(H;C; t)]q(t; F ): (8)
15
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Note that p(L; T; t) = p(H;T; t), so the RHS of (5) is equal to the LHS of (6). Thus, combining
these two inequalities, we have
p(L; T; c)q(c; S) + [1  p(L; T; c)]q(c; F )  p(H;T; c)q(c; S) + [1  p(H;T; c)]q(c; F ); (9)
which reduces to
[p(H;T; c)  p(L; T; c)][q(c; S)  q(c; F )]  0: (10)
Since p(H;T; c) > p(L; T; c) we conclude that
q(c; S)  q(c; F ): (11)
Similarly, combining inequalities (7) and (8), we obtain
q(c; S)  q(c; F ): (12)
Now, by (11) and (12), we have that
q(c; S) = q(c; F ): (13)
A simple calculation yields that
q(c; S) =
p(H;C; c)!
p(H;C; c)! + p(L; T; c)(1  )(1  !)
q(c; F ) =
[1  p(H;C; c)]!
[1  p(H;C; c)]! + [1  p(L; T; c)](1  )(1  !) :
Thus, q(c; S) = q(c; F ) implies that p(H;C; c) = p(L; T; c), which is ruled out by assumption,
thus leading to a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. Upon receiving a signal, s, the agent forms the following beliefs
about his own ability:
(L) = Prf = Hjs = Lg = (1  k)
(1  k) + (1  )k (14)
(H) = Prf = Hjs = Hg = k
k + (1  )(1  k) (15)
where (s) denotes the probability that the agent is of high ability given that he received
signal s. Note that for k > 12 , we have (H) > (L). Suppose this strategy prole were an
equilibrium. Consider the complex state, ! = C. Notice that the posteriors induced by the
strategy prole are identical to those in Proposition 1. Write
(H;C; c) = p(H;C; c)q(c; S) + (1  p(H;C; c))q(c; F ) (16)
16
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(L;C; c) = p(L;C; c)q(c; S) + (1  p(L;C; c))q(c; F ): (17)
Thus the necessary conditions are as follows. For the agent who has received signal H,
(H)(H;C; c) + (1  (H))(L;C; c)  ; (18)
and for the agent who has received signal L,
(L)(H;C; c) + (1  (L))(L;C; c)  : (19)
Note that
Pr(s = H) = k + (1  )(1  k) (20)
Pr(s = L) = k + (1  )(1  k): (21)
Multiplying the rst necessary condition by Pr(s = H) and the second by Pr(s = L) and
adding up gives us
  
as before, so both the inequalities must be equalities. However then, if we subtract the second
equality from the rst, we get
(H;C; c)[(H)  (L)]  (L;C; c)[(H)  (L)] = 0: (22)
This can be shown to be equivalent to
[(H)  (L)][p(H;C; c)  p(L;C; c)][q(c; S)  q(c; F )] = 0: (23)
Since (H) > (L) when k > 12 , and since p(H;C; c) > p(L;C; c), it must be then the case
that q(c; S) = q(c; F ); but this is impossible. A contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose this were an equilibrium. Consider the case when the
state is trivial, ! = T . Dene
(H;T; c) = p(H;T; c)q(c; S) + (1  p(H;T; c))q(c; F ); (24)
(L; T; c) = p(L; T; c)q(c; S) + (1  p(L; T; c))q(c; F ); (25)
and, analogously, (H;T; t) and (L; T; t). Necessary conditions in this equilibrium are as
follows. For the agent who has received the high signal,
(H)(H;T; t) + (1  (H))(L; T; t)  (H)(H;T; c) + (1  (H))(L; T; c); (26)
and for the agent who has received the low signal,
(L)(H;T; c) + (1  (L))(L; T; c)  (L)(H;T; t) + (1  (L))(L; T; t): (27)
17
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Since p(H;T; t) = p(L; T; t), we have that (H;T; t) = (L; T; t). Thus, the LHS of the rst
inequality is simply (H;T; t); which is equal to the RHS of the second inequality. Therefore,
we have
(L)(H;T; c) + (1  (L))(L; T; c)  (H)(H;T; c) + (1  (H))(L; T; c): (28)
This implies that
[p(H;T; c)  p(L; T; c)][q(c; S)  q(c; F )]  0: (29)
Since p(H;T; c) > p(L; T; c), we have that q(c; S)  q(c; F ). Similarly, by considering the
necessary conditions in the state ! = C; we would obtain that q(c; S)  q(c; F ). Thus, it
must be the case that q(c; S) = q(c; F ). Tedious computations yield the following expression
for q(c; S):
p(H;T; c)(1  k)0! + p(H;C; c)k!
p(H;T; c)(1  k)0! + p(H;C; c)k! + p(L; T; c)k00! + p(L;C; c)(1  k)
0
!
where 
0
! = 1 ! and 
0
 = 1 . The expression for q(c; F ) is identical except for the fact
that all p(; ; ) are replaced by 1  p(; ; ). Given the parameters of the model, the equation
q(c; S) = q(c; F ) denes a polynomial in k which can have at most a nite number of roots.
This is easiest to see in the case when ! = 12 when the resulting polynomial is linear, thus
resulting in at most a single value of k for which the equation is satised.
Proof of Proposition 6. We prove the result for the case where p(; T; ) > p(; C; ),
for all type-action pairs (; ). A similar argument proves the claim for the case where the
preceding inequality is reversed.
Let the state be ! = T . If the rst-best were to be an equilibrium, then the following
would hold:
p(L; T; t)q(t; S) + [1  p(L; T; t)]q(t; F )  p(L; T; c)q(c; S) + [1  p(L; T; c)]q(c; F )
p(H;T; t)q(t; S) + [1  p(H;T; t)]q(t; F )  p(H;T; c)q(c; S) + [1  p(H;T; c)]q(c; F ):
Due to type-monotonicity, under the rst-best prole, it is always true that q(c; S) > q(c; F ).
Now, state-monotonicity implies that
p(L; T; t)q(t; S) + [1  p(L; T; t)]q(t; F ) > p(L;C; c)q(c; S) + [1  p(L;C; c)]q(c; F )
p(H;T; t)q(t; S) + [1  p(H;T; t)]q(t; F ) > p(H;C; c)q(c; S) + [1  p(H;C; c)]q(c; F ):
Multiply each inequality by the prior probabilities 1    and  respectively. The law of
iterated expectation implies that adding up the inequalities will yield
 > ;
a contradiction.
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